

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

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THE UNIVERSITY  
OF MICHIGAN

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COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-SECOND MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Monday, 10 June 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Ato M. CHEBEYEHU

(Ethiopia)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J. de CASTRO

Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Mr. V. ISMIRLIEV

Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. S.F. RAE

Mr. A.E. GOTTLIEB

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. L. ŠIMOVIČ

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. F. DOBIAŠ

Mr. Z. SEINER

Ethiopia:

Ato M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Mr. S.B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI

Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. MBU

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. LACHS

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. O. NEDA

Mr. S. SERBANESCU

Sweden:

Baron C.H. von PLATEN

Mr. G. ZETTERQVIST

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN

Mr. O.A. GRINEVSKY

Mr. M.V. ANTIASOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN

Mr. S. AHMED

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON

Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN

Mr. D.N. BRINSON

Mr. R.C. BEETHAM

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE

Mr. A.L. RICHARDS

Mr. D.E. MARK

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Ethiopia): I declare open the one hundred and forty-second plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Asking the Committee's permission to speak first, I should like, as representative of Ethiopia and also on behalf of the delegations of Nigeria and the United Arab Republic, to state the following.

As all members of the Committee well know, thirty heads of independent African States met at Addis Ababa between 22 and 25 May in the historic first all-African Summit Conference. Among many other acute problems with which they were concerned, they gave close attention to the transcendently important question of general and complete disarmament, and to the urgent question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. The latter problem, it should be emphasized, has been a source of worry and anxiety to the whole of mankind, and of deep concern particularly to the African peoples and Government.

Because of the significance of this first African Summit Conference's resolution (ENDC/93/Rev.1) on the problems of general and complete disarmament, and because of its bearing on the work of our Committee here, permit me to read out that resolution:

"The Summit Conference of Independent African States meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 22 May to 25 May 1963:

"Having considered all aspects of the questions of general disarmament;

"Unanimously convinced of the imperious and urgent necessity of co-ordinating and intensifying their efforts to contribute to the achievement of a realistic disarmament programme through the signing, by all States concerned, of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control;

"Have agreed unanimously to concert and co-ordinate their efforts and action in these various fields, and to this end have decided on the following measures:

"1. To affirm and respect the principle of declaring Africa a Denuclearized Zone; to oppose all nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests, as well as the manufacture of nuclear weapons; and to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy;

"2. The destruction of existing nuclear weapons;

"3. To undertake to bring about, by means of negotiation, the end of military occupation of the African continent and the elimination of military bases and nuclear tests, which elimination constitutes a basic element of African Independence and Unity;

(The Chairman, Ethiopia)

"4. To appeal to the great Powers to:

- (a) reduce conventional weapons;
- (b) put an end to the arms race; and
- (c) sign a general and complete disarmament agreement under strict and effective international control;

"5. To appeal to the great Powers, in particular to the Soviet Union and the United States of America, to use their best endeavours to secure the objectives stated above."

The delegations of Ethiopia, Nigeria and the United Arab Republic would appreciate it if the Secretariat would distribute this resolution as an official document of our Conference. 1/

Mr. MBU (Nigeria): I have the pleasure to present, on behalf of the three African delegations to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, a memorandum 2/ on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests:

"The Delegations of Ethiopia, Nigeria and the U.A.R. to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee:

"In fulfilment of the policies and wishes of their respective Governments;

"In the light of the historic meeting of the Heads of Independent African States and Governments, held at Addis Ababa from 22 to 25 May 1963, in which they gave close attention to the urgent problem of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests which has been a source of deep concern, particularly to the African peoples and Governments;

"And in furtherance of the aims and the spirit of the African Summit Conference's Resolution on the problems of General and Complete Disarmament;

"Now address the following thoughts and considerations to the Nuclear Powers:

"1. They are firmly convinced that the nuclear Powers can agree to end all further nuclear testing, under satisfactory and safeguarded conditions, in the immediate future. Present-day circumstances, as well as technical, military and economic considerations, all favour the immediate conclusion of a test-ban treaty. The positions of the nuclear Powers have never been closer than at present. The whole world has pinned its hopes on the sense of wisdom and practicality of the nuclear Powers. The world will not understand or condone their failure to bridge the residual final gap on such a vital and far-reaching issue as the cessation of nuclear tests.

1/ Circulated as document ENDC/93/Rev.1

2/ Circulated as document ENDC/94

(Mr. Mbu, Nigeria)

"2. The conclusion of a test-ban treaty is likely to bring about a general improvement in international relations, to herald the settlement of other pending problems, to inhibit the further spread of nuclear weapons and to contribute to the slackening of the nuclear armaments race. It will certainly put an end to radiation hazards and to the poisoning of Man's environments. It will save humanity and posterity from untold worries and suffering. It will release the nuclear Powers' much-needed energy, funds, and technical knowhow and channel them to peaceful endeavours, to more profitable enterprises which are badly needed by the majority of mankind, especially by the African, Asian, and Latin-American peoples.

"3. The three aforementioned Delegations are convinced that direct contacts between the nuclear Powers, for example on the Foreign Ministers' level, and possibly direct communications and contacts between the Heads of the nuclear States and Governments, may prove of great value in reaching a quick and adequate solution of this problem.

"It is for this reason that the Heads of African States and Governments meeting at Addis Ababa have appealed to the nuclear Powers to spare no diplomatic effort and to work unceasingly towards reaching an immediate agreement fulfilling the hopes and dreams of mankind, without letting political problems inhibit the progress of their negotiations. In the light of present circumstances, time is of the essence. The nuclear Powers should not let this propitious moment slip away for want of a resolute and determined effort to reach an agreement which all the world, including the nuclear Powers, needs and aspires to.

"4. Various non-aligned delegations to our Committee, during the last three months produced many valuable ideas and thoughts which are well-known to the nuclear Powers, and which aimed at breaking the deadlock in the Geneva test-ban negotiations about the number of inspections as well as about the method of discussing the quota-figures in relation to the study of the modalities of inspections.

"The three African Delegations earnestly appeal to the nuclear Powers to give attention to those non-aligned ideas and thoughts as well as to their continued attempts at finding practical, honourable and equitable compromises, which, in the last analysis, may prove to be good and lasting solutions to the test-ban problem.

(Mr. Mbu, Nigeria)

"5. Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy's exchange of letters in December and January on the cessation of tests has given proof of the existence, on both sides, of a welcome spirit of constructive compromise and mutual accommodation, and above all, of courage and goodwill.

"6. It may very well be that science may, in the future, show beyond doubt that on-site inspections may no longer be needed to identify suspicious seismic events or to adequately control a test-ban treaty. For the time-being, however, the three African Delegations recognize that three, four or so, yearly truly effective inspections -- or an adequately proportionate figure spread over more years -- may be needed to dispel mutual suspicions, to help build up confidence between the nuclear Powers and, no less importantly, to facilitate their reaching a practical political settlement.

"7. After having maintained that there was no need for any obligatory inspections, Mr. Khrushchev's offer last December of three on-site inspections must therefore be taken as a sign of moral courage and good faith. In a like manner, the current British-American démarches at Moscow, and their offer of the possibility of further compromise, should be encouraged and taken as a sign of political courage and goodwill.

"8. The three African Delegations are convinced that they speak not only for their own people and all the African peoples, but for the whole world, when they urgently appeal to the nuclear Powers to give more proof of a much-needed sense of practicality and of a necessary spirit of constructive compromise and goodwill. The world will hail and appreciate any show of compromise as evidence of great moral courage, political acumen and love for peace. On the other hand, the world cannot but consider their failure to compromise over the last few remaining differences as unwillingness on their part to end nuclear testing and the nuclear armaments race, essential conditions for any constructive and realistic discussion of general and complete disarmament.

"9. Since there is general agreement, however, that the number of on-site inspections is less relevant than the terms of the modalities or conditions for the adequate and effective conduct of such on-site inspections, the three Delegations therefore exhort the nuclear Powers to rise above quarrelling on an insignificant difference of one or two inspections, and to accept a reasonable compromise-quota of inspections contingent upon adequate and effective modalities on inspection.

"10. Agreement on the latter should be sought, inter alia, in these illustrative areas:



(Mr. Mbu, Nigeria)

- (a) The location of the epicentre of the seismic event;
- (b) Criteria for the eligibility of the seismic event for inspection;
- (c) Composition of the International Scientific Committee and its role in the establishment of the criteria and the supervising of their proper application;
- (d) Agreement on the initiation of inspections according to agreed criteria and to the data submitted to the International Committee;
- (e) The composition of the inspection teams in such a way as to obviate self-inspection and to ensure the effectiveness and the adequacy of the visit;
- (f) Agreement on the criteria and relevant details of the actual conducting of the inspection;
- (g) Agreement on the shape and size of the inspection area;
- (h) Safeguards against abuse and against the utilization of such facilities and inspection personnel in any manner that might be extraneous to the purpose of identifying the event concerned or that might endanger the security of the receiving State.

"In the name of the African peoples and in the name of all humanity, the three African Delegations address this urgent appeal to the nuclear Powers to give the world proof of their goodwill, of their seriousness of purpose, and of their sense of responsibility by issuing the necessary instructions to their representatives in the test-ban negotiations to come to the quick and equitable compromise solutions which the whole world is expecting of them, and whose groundwork has already been laid during the last three months of negotiations at Geneva."

The New York Times, commenting on the prospects of an agreement being reached on the "hot line", had this to say on Saturday 8 June:

"Geneva, graveyard of so many hopes, has at last produced one important agreement." The comment continues further on:

"The new agreement, first positive result of the fifteen-month-old Geneva disarmament conference, could be a breakthrough -- especially on a test ban on which the differences have become minimal."

The three aforementioned African delegations would like to join in echoing that pious wish that to that important agreement on the "hot line" there be added agreement on a test ban. If we can achieve a test ban, then we can justify our prolonged stay here by proving that in Geneva we not only bark but also bite. If we can talk that nuclear genie into the bottle now, prospects of mankind's continued existence will have been substantially assured.

(Mr. Mbu, Nigeria)

At no stage in the evolution of man has the human race faced worse or more utterly dreadful prospects of total extinction than since man discovered the atom bomb. In prehistoric times, man -- defenceless as he was -- survived the hazards of his time by the kind mercy of mother nature. With the atom, man is trying to change the course of nature, and only man -- the discoverer of that dreadful thing he calls the atom bomb -- can save himself from the inevitable global suicide of a thermonuclear war.

Mr. HASSAN (United Arab Republic): It is a source of gratification to my delegation, and to all of us, I am sure, to hear the welcome news which has been circulated recently about an imminent agreement between the two major nuclear Powers on the establishment of a direct communication line between their two Governments as part of the measures envisaged by them to reduce the risk of war by accident, miscalculation or failure of communications. The news has strengthened our conviction of the value of the continuation of this Conference and of the high-level contacts between the interested parties for the cause of world peace and security.

That imminent agreement is also significant of the existence of good will on both sides, as well as of their determination to come to an understanding about disarmament, collateral measures and the cessation of all nuclear tests. It is also a source of gratification to us that this should take place on the heels of the African summit conference, for no doubt it is further proof that the leaders of the nuclear Powers as well as the heads of other responsible governments do share the same yearning for peace and security.

That spirit of mutual understanding and high political acumen shown by the leaders of the two major nuclear Powers is, in fact, what makes the eyes of this Conference and of all peace-loving peoples in the world turn towards those two great world leaders. For they are showing us that they have enough moral courage and stature to enable them to solve many of the pending problems of the world.

It is that very same spirit of mutual understanding and good intentions -- added, no doubt, to the ever-increasing consciousness of world public opinion generally and of African public opinion particularly, as evidenced by the Addis Ababa Conference -- which now encourage the delegations of the three non-aligned African States to present their Joint Memorandum to this Conference.

In so doing, the three delegations are naturally fully aware that bilateral discussions are going on between the two parties. The present memorandum, however, is not an attempt to impose or intrude extraneous elements into those bilateral talks. The memorandum, in the belief of its co-sponsors, presents just one honourable approach to a compromise settlement. There may be, naturally, other approaches. And indeed the three delegations would be very happy if the nuclear Powers reached an agreement, through this or other means. The important thing is that they should agree. And the three delegations regard their common endeavour as a modest contribution to help reach such an end. The African delegations' memorandum is, furthermore, an expression of the great yearning and desire of the African peoples and their governments to see the end of all nuclear testing as soon as possible.

Our modest contribution towards finding a compromise solution may not have brought startlingly new proposals or ideas which many of us had not thought of or been discussing before. However, it may be a crystallization, for the benefit of this Conference and the negotiators, of the general ideas and outlines within which such a compromise settlement may be sought and reached.

My delegation is convinced, and obviously all of us around this table agree, that the present moment is the most propitious for redoubling our efforts to reach our worthy goal. The fact is that the positions of the nuclear Powers have never been closer than at present. There are many political, psychological, technical and economic considerations which are already well known to the whole world and which should weigh heavily in favour of the nuclear Powers' reaching an early agreement on the cessation of all tests.

The three African nations' joint memorandum is therefore the outcome of all the considerations I have mentioned and a fulfilment of the directives of the African Heads of States given at Addis Ababa.

In our memorandum, I submit, we have tried to embody, and to the best of our ability have succeeded in embodying, that much-needed element of sympathy with whatever legitimate difficulties there may be in either of the nuclear Powers' positions, as well as the elements of their national prestige. Above all, we are fully satisfied that it does lay the groundwork for a settlement on the basis of equality in honour.

The various suggestions and thoughts in the memorandum constitute an interdependent and well-balanced indivisible entity which, taken as a whole, should be a satisfactory and honourable way out of the present procedural impasse, a neutral rallying ground for the two hitherto irreconcilable positions, and a good starting-point for constructive negotiations on a test ban treaty.

The idea that the nuclear Powers should accept the quota figure conditionally is not a new one. As a matter of fact both parties have accepted it in the past.

Mr. Tsarapkin on 25 March 1963 invited Mr. Stelle --

"to accept the figure of two to three inspections; ... you can even make a reservation to the effect that your acceptance of this quota of inspections is conditional and depends on the achievement of agreement on the modalities of inspection." (ENDC/PV.113, p.21)

In that way, he hoped, there should be good possibilities for making progress in our negotiations. Much along the same line of thought, Mr. Stelle told us on the same day that Mr. Foster had --

"proposed the figure of seven on-site inspections, but he made that figure conditional upon Soviet agreement in principle to the kind of inspection arrangements which [the United States] ... subsequently outlined for the Committee." (ibid., p.32)

It was therefore imperative that the three non-aligned African delegations, in their attempts at a satisfactory compromise, should be quick to seize upon this rare and happy moment of similarity in approach between the representatives of the two great nuclear Powers. The delegations of Ethiopia, Nigeria and the United Arab Republic are convinced that a test ban treaty remains within the reach of the nuclear Powers if there is enough political will to translate their mutual desires into reality.

A very important New York Times editorial on 25 March 1963, speaking about the need for on-site inspections, said:

"The exact number is less important than the manner in which they are made. Even here scientific progress has enabled us to reduce the number of proffered on-site inspections to a mere handful and future progress may permit even further reduction."

A more recent editorial of The New York Times, on 3 June 1963, said:

"The adequacy of such inspection is now the chief issue. The United States and Britain are down to seven inspections a year, while the Soviets offer only three; but the two Western allies give every indication of flexibility on the number, provided the inspections are not turned into mere 'conducted tours'. If the methods of inspection could be settled, the main obstacle to a treaty would be removed and all tests could stop at once."

We are convinced that it would not, therefore, be beyond the resourcefulness and realism of the nuclear Powers to find a mutually-satisfactory agreement, based perhaps on a quota number which is near the number offered by the Soviet Union, and on effective modalities which might take into consideration the areas proposed by the United States for agreement on the modalities and which would guarantee that inspections should be more than a mere symbol.

The representative of the Soviet Union has repeatedly told this Committee that, if agreement on the quota figures were reached today, the Soviet Union would be ready to discuss the modalities tomorrow; he also has told us often -- after we listened to the kind of modalities that the United States had in mind -- that he felt that agreement on the modalities would then be around the corner.

The United Arab Republic delegation would indeed be gratified if the efforts of the three African non-aligned delegations were to help to remove the obstacle from the way of agreement on the quota figure. But once that difficulty is removed it would be in the interest of the nuclear Powers and the whole world if they reached quick agreement on practical and efficient criteria and arrangements which might maximize the deterrent effect of on-site inspections and increase their confidence-building value.

The representative of Bulgaria, Mr. Tarabanov, told us on 25 March 1963:

"The Soviet Union went to New York and Washington for the specific purpose of satisfying the desire of the Western Powers, and particularly of the United States, for a clarification of the technical problems."

(ENDC/PV.113, p.37)

He went on to comment on those New York and Washington talks in the following words:

"There were certainly some outstanding questions, and, as far as the Soviet Union was concerned, these were precisely those technical questions, relating perhaps to the methods of inspection, which are being raised here by the Western representatives and which might have been settled in this review of all past conversations and negotiations..." (ibid., p.39)

The representative of Bulgaria made his meaning clear: once the issue of the quota figures was disposed of, the Soviet Union was ready to settle all those same outstanding technical questions which the Western representatives have raised here. That indeed is an encouraging statement.

Our Committee, therefore, should have every reason to expect that, once the quota issue was satisfactorily disposed of in the foregoing manner, it should not be difficult to attain agreement on impartial and adequately-selected inspection teams, and on the choice of internationally-recognized, sound and realistic criteria for determining the eligibility of events for inspection, and for the location of the epicentres of the events in question. Consideration might also be given to the reciprocal aspect of inspection arrangements under internationally-acceptable and supervised criteria. Agreement might also be sought on a realistic and meaningful delineation of the shape and size of the areas which might be opened for inspection, as well as on adequate and practical safeguards which should guarantee the security of the host State in the aforesaid circumstances. The nuclear Powers should find the international scientific commission able and ready to help them in the establishment and in the proper implementation of those criteria and arrangements.

With the Committee's permission, I am now going to turn to another subject which, in our opinion, is still very closely connected with the nuclear test ban. This is not a haphazard digression or a break-away from established rules relative to the discussion of our topics, but rather it is an advised reference to the subject of collateral measures because of our deep conviction that a package deal built around the cessation of tests and comprising some ripe and practicable collateral measures may indeed facilitate reaching agreement on the whole question. If this may seem to be a novel idea, it appears to my delegation to be an obvious one.

The voices which are raised in favour of the cessation of all tests emanate from all corners and all continents of the world. If today we are dealing with the voices of the leaders of independent Africa, just one week earlier the voices of President Abdel Nasser and President Tito were raised from Europe -- at Belgrade -- and these should be added to the voices of all humanity exhorting the leaders of the major nuclear Powers to settle their differences regarding the test ban, as well as the other closely-connected problems which might have a bearing on the cessation of tests. For, apart from its intrinsic value, agreement by the nuclear Powers to ban all nuclear tests under effective international inspection would also signify their determination to respect such an agreement and to live up to it. This would also imply their determination to put an end to the nuclear arms race and, logically, to prevent atomic proliferation.

In this connexion the delegation of the United Arab Republic would like to draw the attention of the Committee to the official joint communiqué which was published upon the termination of the State visit of President Abdel Nasser to the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia between 12 and 16 May of this year, a week before the African summit conference. Among other things, the communiqué contained the following:

"The two Presidents have reaffirmed their faith that disarmament is to be considered in the present circumstances as one of the most imperative and the most urgent tasks facing the responsible Governments; that this goal can be attained by an agreement on preliminary and partial disarmament measures which will create favourable conditions and consolidate reciprocal confidence in anticipation of general and complete disarmament and the solution of other pending international problems. The two Presidents attach great importance to the banning of nuclear tests. They consider that the deliberations now going on should result in solutions satisfactory to all States and to the peoples of the whole world.

"The two Presidents therefore appeal to the responsible Powers to spare no effort in order to reach agreement in the near future."

It would seem to my delegation, therefore, that agreement on the cessation of tests would be facilitated if in their present contacts the leaders of the nuclear Powers gave some thought also to the possibility of simultaneous agreement on a few other ripe and practicable collateral measures.

For example, it is self-evident that the freezing of the armaments race is closely tied up with and bears a direct relation to an agreement to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as information relative to their manufacture or uses directly or indirectly, bilaterally or multilaterally, to other States which at present do not possess them. A reaffirmation by and in relation to certain non-nuclear but militarily-significant States of their officially-declared policy of shunning nuclear armament and a consolidation of the foundations of the projected "non-nuclear club" cannot fail to contribute to the decrease of tension and to the chances of a loyal adherence to and implementation of a test ban treaty. If this were truly envisaged, a whole series of other preliminary and partial measures could easily fit in and bolster a well-balanced and practicable package deal, obviously built around a test-ban agreement.

As the Committee is aware, since June 1962 my delegation has stated on many occasions that it sees much merit in this approach. I refer to my statements of 13 June 1962 (ENDC/PV.55, pp.29 et seq.) and 5 September 1962 (ENDC/PV.81, pp.41 et seq.).

In the light of the above-mentioned considerations, and having studied the arguments of the interested parties with regard to the proposed collateral measures, my delegation remains convinced that if the nuclear Powers really desired to reach agreement they could easily come to an understanding on the inclusion in any future multilateral deal of measures such as the reduction of the risks of war by accident, miscalculation, or failure of communication, and a "peaceful co-existence" accord, thus formalizing their understanding to find peaceful and negotiated means of settling their remaining disputes, heralding their determination to end their nuclear armaments race and reaffirming their will to co-operate in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other non-nuclear States -- in a word, formalizing their recent undertakings.

What we have heard in this Committee has only succeeded in reviving our hope in the possible value of an agreement on a series of steps, including the reduction of the risk of war measures proposed by the United States (ENDC/70), one of the components of which seems already near solution, and the non-aggression pact proposed by the Soviet Union (ENDC/77).

Our Committee has agreed that, in order to reach an accord on general and complete disarmament, agreement might first be sought on collateral measures "aimed at the lessening of international tension; the consolidation of confidence among States; and facilitating general and complete disarmament" (ENDC/1/Add.1). If agreement on collateral measures appears to be what our Committee has come to regard as the logical doorway to disarmament, it would seem to my delegation that the logical ~~causeway~~ <sup>causeway</sup> to agreement on collateral measures is a test ban deal. For as long as tests continue the nuclear arms race goes on, as well as suspicions and fears lest the other party should arrive first at the dreaded "break-through" by solving the problem of a workable anti-missile missile, a new neutron bomb or a clean bomb, et cetera. As long as those fears and suspicions persist, how can the nuclear Powers honestly be expected to lessen their tensions and build up their mutual confidence? And if they do not, how can they be expected to reach agreement on general and complete disarmament? And how can our Committee expect its collateral measures and general and complete disarmament negotiations to be anything but sheer academic confabulations, if not a regrettable waste of time?



(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

My delegation has maintained in the past and still contends -- and the Belgrade joint communiqué reaffirms it in a more dramatic manner -- that a collateral measures package deal would be the most balanced and practical approach and would make agreement on some of the initial steps proposed by the East or the West more likely to be acceptable to the other party.

Now that high-level contacts are being resumed between the nuclear Powers, my delegation would earnestly reiterate its hope that it might be possible to give consideration to the possibility of envisaging the solution of the test ban question, as well as of other collateral steps, against the more favourable back-ground of a well-balanced and hence more acceptable arrangement.

It has become increasingly evident that humanity will not be ushered into that long-sought era of peaceful co-existence and confidence between the major Powers until it has slammed the door against the evil wind of the nuclear arms race which dissipates confidence as fast as it can be generated. That is why the time, effort and energy devoted by our Committee, as well as by the heads of the nuclear Powers, to reach a test ban agreement are not only worthwhile but, as many have observed before, essential for the peace of the world.

Before I close I should like once more to reiterate that the three African delegations' modest endeavour of today, far from being an intrusion into the bilateral talks going on between the nuclear parties, should be taken rather for what it truly is, a sincere if modest attempt to focus attention on some constructive and timely viewpoints and to make them directly available to the negotiating nuclear parties. These constructive and timely viewpoints reflect, to the best of our belief, the thinking of world public opinion about the test ban issue. We hope they will prove to be of the same value to our Conference as well as to the high negotiating parties. I am sure I am representing the consensus of opinion of our Conference when I say on behalf of the three African co-sponsors of the memorandum that we wish them every success in their bilateral contacts and hope that soon they will be in a position to present our Conference with a report of their progress.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I think that the statements we have heard this morning on nuclear tests again prove that problem to be still the focus of our interest and efforts.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

I am sure that the memorandum submitted this morning by the delegations of Ethiopia, Nigeria and the United Arab Republic will be studied by all with the closest attention. Today's efforts by these delegations and the important and valuable contribution they have this morning made to our activities are perfectly in keeping with the duties and tasks entrusted to this Committee. The hopes expressed for an end to nuclear tests exactly reflect everyone's desire, and especially the reiterated wish of the Italian delegation.

The Italian delegation has repeatedly stressed not only the importance of the problem but also the part the delegations have to play here with regard to tests. The question of banning nuclear tests does not concern only the nuclear Powers; it is a question of interest to every country in the world, hence to all delegations here present. The main duty of the delegations of the non-nuclear Powers at this Conference is to keep unremittingly and vigorously stressing the fundamental importance of this first step on the way to disarmament the banning of nuclear tests.

My delegation has made repeated appeals on the subject to the Soviet delegation, whose intransigence has unfortunately so far always blocked any progress in our negotiations. We know that at present direct contacts are taking place between the three nuclear Powers. After making an initial attempt to restart negotiations, the Western nuclear Powers again took the initiative. Having received a first reply from the Soviet Union, they sent another note to the Soviet Government. All these contacts and all the correspondence are confidential and remain secret. I think this proves the West's resolute will and the sincerity of its approach. When proposals are made for propaganda purposes, they are immediately broadcast and publicly discussed, even before the governments concerned make known their views or send their replies through diplomatic channels. That explains why, far from being shocked by the secrecy at present surrounding the direct tripartite negotiations, we find in it a reason for hope, if not confidence.

The Geneva Conference, which has still before it the top-priority test ban problem, must nevertheless also continue to do its duty. Its Monday meetings must not be just waiting, silent periods. At all events, this morning's has been no

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

silent meeting! These meetings should give all the delegations a useful opportunity to exert the pressure of their convictions on the nuclear Powers in order to make them take the remaining step towards a test-ban agreement.

The Western Powers' goodwill has just been once more proved. Their first approach to the Soviet Union has been followed by another. They are indefatigably exploring every avenue to reach an agreement. It is now up to the Soviet Union to abandon its intransigence and to respond at length constructively to the West's important overtures. So it is to the Soviet delegation that our appeals must especially be addressed, in the hope that the Soviet leaders' sense of responsibility will finally triumph over intransigence, inflexibility and doubt.

Several delegations, among them the Soviet delegation, have recently expressed lofty sentiments on the death of His Holiness Pope John XXIII. Much stress was laid on his efforts for peace and his desire for universal brotherhood. I think there could be no better memorial to that man of peace than the conclusion of an agreement ridding mankind of the terrible dangers of thermonuclear explosions. May his great spirit, then, guide the statesmen in whose hands now lies the decision for or against the continuation of this nuclear test race that is so baleful and dangerous for human destiny. May all the teachings of peace and brotherhood which John XXIII has bequeathed to us early bear the fruits he had in mind.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): First of all, the Soviet delegation would like to note the undoubtedly positive and very valuable contribution to the cause of disarmament contained in the decisions taken by the all-African Conference of Heads of States and Governments held towards the end of May in Addis Ababa, the capital of one of the oldest African States. As can be seen from the resolution on general and complete disarmament read out to us by the representative of Ethiopia (ENDC/93/Rev.1), the participants in that Conference expressed themselves in favour of the speediest solution of this cardinal problem of our time, which is of vital importance to mankind.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Those who have followed the course of that remarkably important conference, which is indeed a turning point in the history of the African continent, those who have carefully studied the resolutions adopted by that conference can easily see that the African leaders realize that complete and lasting success in accomplishing the aim of liberating Africa, which the peoples of Africa have set before themselves, is indissolubly linked with the safeguarding of general peace and security based on the principles of peaceful co-existence. Being profoundly aware of this, the Heads of all African States and Governments confirmed in the adopted resolution their will to carry out the decision to turn Africa into a nuclear-free zone and to secure the ending of the military occupation of the African continent, the liquidation of foreign military bases in Africa, and the cessation of nuclear tests.

We welcome these decisions and note that their implementation would contribute to a considerable extent towards the lessening of tension in international relations, towards reducing the threat of a thermonuclear war, and towards facilitating the solution of the problem of disarmament.

I now turn to the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. A new factor in this field is the fact that the United States "gladdened" the world by carrying out two more nuclear explosions in Nevada on 5 and 6 June. The nuclear explosions carried out by the United States are a most unmistakable indication of the true aims of the United States, the most certain characteristic of its position on the question of the cessation of nuclear tests and on the question of disarmament in general.

All over the world political leaders, scientists, artists, hundreds of millions of ordinary people, all people of goodwill, are asking one and the same question: why is the United States doing this when the whole world has appealed to all the nuclear Powers to cease all nuclear explosions from 1 January 1963? They are asking themselves this question and find no reasonable, convincing answer. As far back as two years ago statements were being made in the United States to the effect that the United States possessed an overabundance of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery.

In this connexion I should like to recall a report published in the New York Times on 1 September 1961. It gave information regarding a meeting which took place on 31 August 1961, between the President of the United States and the members of the National Security Council, together with certain leaders of Congress. In this report it was pointed out that --

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

"The President is entirely confident that the size of the United States nuclear weapons stockpiles and the capabilities of the individual weapons and delivery systems are wholly adequate for the defence of the United States and of the free world".

The United States says openly that it has in its arsenals many tens of thousands of nuclear bombs of various types, categories and calibres with the widest range of power; that it has such an immense quantity of nuclear weapons as, according to its own statements, would suffice to destroy all the objectives and targets in the world many times over. In these circumstances the legitimate question arises: why and for what purpose is the United States carrying out one series of nuclear explosions after another? Why has the United States, showing ill will, crudely and contemptuously rejected the earnest appeal of the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly to the nuclear Powers to cease nuclear weapon tests after 1 January 1963 (A/RES/1762 (XVII); ENDC/63), and thereby given a new impetus to the nuclear armaments race?

The United States and France, allies in the aggressive NATO bloc, by resuming nuclear tests after 1 January 1963, have thrown down a flagrant challenge to the whole United Nations. These actions of the Western Powers show their true attitude towards the United Nations and its decisions. Without hesitation they have rejected and rudely trampled underfoot everything that stands for peace, for the cessation of the armaments race, for the lessening of international tension and for disarmament. They rejected the appeal of the General Assembly to cease all nuclear weapon tests after 1 January 1963 even though they themselves admit that further nuclear explosions virtually have no longer -- for the United States -- any serious military importance for the development of nuclear weapons. Why, then, is the United States continuing nuclear tests? Apparently in order to sustain and further increase the tension in international relations and to develop newer and still more deadly means of nuclear aggression.

Everything is being done in the United States to prevent the question of nuclear tests from going off the rails along which the whole policy of NATO moves. There is no doubt that the achievement of agreement on such questions as the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries, renunciation by States of the use of foreign territories for

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

stationing strategic means of delivery, and the establishment of denuclearized zones in various parts of the world would contribute towards the lessening of international tension, towards the growth of confidence, and consequently towards seriously reducing the threat of a nuclear missile war. But it is precisely such a turn in international affairs that is unacceptable to those in command in NATO, whose policy is aimed at further aggravating the international situation and preparing for war.

We know that the representatives of the Western Powers may reply, as usual, that this is not so, because the United States desires an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, provided there is international inspection as a means of verifying that the treaty is not being violated or, to put it more accurately, in order to inspect any arbitrarily-selected natural earthquakes. We have already analysed this position of the United States very thoroughly and objectively in the past; we have shown, on the one hand, that it is untenable, because in the present conditions there is no need at all for inspection; and, on the other hand, we have uncovered the true reasons for the stubbornness and persistence with which the United States is trying to secure acceptance of its demand to send foreign inspection teams into the territory of the Soviet Union. This is being done in order to obtain, in the event of an agreement to cease nuclear tests, the right to organize the collection of intelligence data in the Soviet Union by means of inspection. Such demands in these days can only increase suspicion and mistrust. This condition is put forward by the Western Powers solely in the interests of the NATO staffs, which are preparing aggressive plans.

We have already pointed out repeatedly that without disarmament in the conditions prevailing today, when the military preparations of the NATO Powers are becoming more intensive not only every year but every month; when their preparations for a nuclear missile war are being accelerated; when United States nuclear missile bases on foreign territories are being extended and brought up-to-date; when nuclear submarines carrying Polaris missiles equipped with nuclear warheads are hastily being put into service and are already cruising in the waters surrounding the Soviet countries; when the Western Powers are making feverish efforts to create a so-called

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

NATO nuclear striking force, giving access to nuclear weapons to the West German militarists and revanchists; when NATO, in working out its aggressive plans, is concentrating its efforts more than ever on the collection of intelligence and espionage information regarding the defence system of the Soviet Union and the location of its most important defence installations; when precise lists of targets for bombardment by the NATO nuclear force are hastily being drawn up -- in these conditions the security interests of the Soviet State leave no room for so-called international control or international inspection, that is, in fact, for foreign intelligence activities and espionage on Soviet territory.

As early as 12 December 1961, at the 346th meeting of the Three-Power Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, we pointed out that any attempt by the United States to continue the discussion at our Conference on the old basis, any attempt to make out that no agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests is possible without international control, merely reveals the true position of the United States, in the sense that what it needs is not an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests but the opportunity to establish on the territory of the Soviet Union a system of international control without disarmament -- that is, a system of intelligence and espionage (GEN/DNT/PV.346, p.11).

Even at that time we pointed out that for control over compliance with an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests an international control system was not required and that national means for the detection of nuclear explosions were fully adequate. But since we said that, science and technology have made great progress in that respect, and what was quite true and well-founded as far back as in 1961 or even in 1960 has now become axiomatic. We have already on numerous occasions cited very convincing evidence of the successes in this field both in the United Kingdom and in the United States. I should like to recall these facts briefly once again.

A survey of the capabilities provided by national means of detection shows that there is no real need for on-site inspections to ensure compliance with a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapon tests. That is the situation at the present time. And if we take a look at the immediate prospects, in this regard there are interesting data which definitely show that in a short while still more effective new methods of

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

detecting and identifying underground nuclear explosions and still more effective recording instruments will have been finally worked out. New, complex, highly-sensitive seismic stations with a high selective capacity will be built.

I should like to refer to the following facts:

First. Early in January 1962, that is a year and a half ago, a report was published in the United Kingdom on experiments in the use of recording apparatus which were carried out by the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority. These experiments made it possible to work out a method for detecting underground nuclear explosions by measuring their effect on the earth's magnetic field. It was pointed out in the report that, in the opinion of British scientists, the practical application of this method would make it impossible for any country to carry out clandestine nuclear explosions.

Second. In March 1962, that is over a year ago, reports were published in the United Kingdom press regarding another new method of detecting nuclear explosions worked out by British specialists. It was noted in these publications that even the United Kingdom Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan, spoke about this new method of detecting underground nuclear explosions. The nuclear explosions detection station located at Eskdalemuir in the Lake District is the one concerned. It was pointed out that this station could distinguish with greater reliability than was considered possible before between underground nuclear explosions and minor earthquakes. It was also pointed out that a new computing method had been worked out in the United Kingdom which would make it possible to use a combination of seismographs simultaneously so as to obtain more detailed information on the scale, type, direction and force of a nuclear explosion. This new method makes it possible to distinguish clearly between nuclear explosions and ordinary earthquakes.

Third. In October 1962, about nine months ago, the California Institute of Technology reported that an instrument had been developed in the United States which could automatically distinguish between vibrations of the earth's crust caused by earthquakes from vibrations caused by nuclear explosions. This instrument consists of a combination of seismographs and electronic computers. It was built on orders



(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

from the United States Air Force, not, of course, as you all realize, for the purposes of control over an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests but, on the contrary, for certain control and measuring operations in connexion with the carrying out of nuclear weapon tests. Scientists consider that the automatic analysis of seismic events which can be carried out with this instrument speeds up the detection of nuclear explosions at great distances. The well-known United States seismologist, Dr. Frank Press, who invented this instrument, stated --- and I quote his words as they were published in October 1962 by the Associated Press:

"This device makes it possible to record upheavals of the earth's crust throughout the whole seismic spectrum and has a great accuracy and a wide range of application. The range of application of the device is limited only by the imagination of research workers."

That is what Dr. Frank Press said about the capabilities of this device. Here the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, has tried to minimize the importance of this invention. But he has not succeeded in the least in weakening the strength of the impression and conviction felt by all those who have read the report on this invention of the United States scientist and seismologist Dr. Frank Press.

The three facts I have adduced are interesting in that they show even more clearly the invalidity of the United States position in regard to the prohibition of underground tests and the invalidity of its claims in regard to inspection. We have already pointed out on many occasions that the truth is finally beginning to emerge from the deep recesses of the government machinery of the United States regarding the progress which has been made in the detection of underground nuclear explosions.

With regard to the capability of the United States detection system, Senator Humphrey said:

"... the United States system is capable of detecting some seismic events below the presumed 'threshold', so that no nation could be sure that its clandestine tests would go undetected." (ENDC/82, p.19)

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

On 7 March Senator Humphrey made a remarkable statement in the Senate in which he frankly stated that those in the United States who are opposed to an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests have been intentionally concealing the real facts regarding the effectiveness of the United States observation system, and he appealed to have these facts made public. He said:

"The fact is that our detection capability [of nuclear explosions] ... is much greater than the press has led us to believe on the basis of information it has received from the United States Government." (ibid.,p.20)

He emphasized that the results of three years' research in this field in the United States were phenomenal. That is Senator Humphrey's genuine assessment.

In the light of these advances in the detection of underground nuclear explosions, it has become quite obvious that for the purpose of control over compliance with a treaty the national means of detection at the disposal of States are fully adequate. This is now not only the view of the Soviet Union, but in the United States and the United Kingdom also a good many responsible political leaders agree with it. It appears that in the United States the conclusion has been reached that national means of detection, national systems, are adequate for detecting and identifying nuclear explosions, or, in other words, for exercising control to ensure that the agreement is not being violated. Thus the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, said on 11 March 1963 before the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs:

"Our increased capabilities of detecting seismic events at great distances enable us to rely for the detection of underground nuclear explosions in the Soviet Union on seismic stations located outside the Soviet Union".

Moreover, Mr. Rusk admitted that the capability of the United States to detect the violation of a ban on nuclear tests is "better than can be revealed".

Those are the words of Mr. Rusk, which show that the United States fully relies on its own system for detecting suspicious seismic events in the territory of the Soviet Union. Consequently there are now no scientific or technical obstacles preventing the United States from agreeing to a treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests based entirely on national systems of detection for control over compliance with such a treaty.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Fourth. The question of inspection will not be properly clarified unless we draw attention to the fact that the technique of detecting and identifying nuclear explosions is constantly being improved, so that United States scientists also have been brought very close to recognizing that on-site inspection is altogether unnecessary.

In this connexion I should like to draw your attention to the United Press report published in the New York Herald Tribune of 13 April 1963:

"University of Michigan scientists, through a 'lucky coincidence', may have stumbled on to a way of telling the difference between earthquakes and underground nuclear tests."

This report states that the University of Michigan had a mobile field station in California at the very moment when both an earthquake and a nuclear explosion occurred. The earthquake was of small magnitude -- four units on the Richter magnitude scale -- while the nuclear explosion took place at the Nevada testing site. A representative of the University of Michigan, Mr. David Willis, stated that this fortunate coincidence offered an exceptional opportunity to compare the seismic waves caused by the two events. He emphasized that there was a very striking difference between them. The nuclear explosion began with a big wave followed by smaller shocks, whereas the earthquake, on the contrary, began with smaller shocks leading to a greater one.

The statement of the representative of the University of Michigan once again confirms that it is fully possible to identify effectively seismic events and to distinguish between natural earthquakes and nuclear explosions without any inspection through the use of national means of detection. This is confirmed in the same article in the New York Herald Tribune:

"This could mean that the United States could detect underground tests by other nations without the need of on-site inspections." (ibid.)

Please note the words without the need of on-site inspections. What does this mean? This means that in the United States also they are at last beginning to come to the conclusion that there is no need for on-site inspection for control over compliance with an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

We have quoted these facts once again because the representatives of the United States pay no attention to them. Of course, they could act in that way only if they had set themselves the aim of imposing their own conditions for an agreement without

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

taking anything or any facts into consideration. But they will not succeed in doing so. The data we have quoted are being ignored by the United States representatives, or they try to brush them aside, precisely because these data completely frustrate the United States demands for inspection. We shall continue to bring up these and other similar facts every time the United States representatives re-state their old position on inspection and insist upon it.

At the meeting of the Committee held on 27 May the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, showed frankly (ENDC/PV.137, pp.5 et seq.) that in regard to the cessation of nuclear weapon tests the United States is still basing itself on its old position which has long been preventing agreement on this question. At that meeting Mr. Stelle again argued on the subject of why the Western Powers insist on the right to send inspection teams deep into the territory of the Soviet Union. Those arguments of Mr. Stelle showed that, even though the United States, when faced with the facts, has been compelled to admit the effectiveness of national means of control in regard to underground explosions; nevertheless it is trying at the same time to maintain its old position on the question of on-site inspection. On that point the United States lapses into an obvious inconsistency in its position, which as a matter of fact has led the negotiations for an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests into an impasse.

We have already pointed out (ENDC/PV.126, p.26) that, having recognized the effectiveness of national systems of control in regard to underground nuclear explosions, the United States ought to have abandoned completely all claims in respect of on-site inspection. Once again we draw the attention of the Eighteen-Nation Committee to the fact that at the present time, from the scientific and technical standpoints, the demand for on-site inspection is unfounded and unnecessary for control over an agreement. This task can perfectly well be carried out by national means for the detection of nuclear explosions.

Unfortunately the official position of the United States has not undergone the necessary radical changes in regard to inspection. The present position of the United States on the question of inspection -- and I emphasize this once again -- is untenable and does not stand up to criticism; in fact, it has led our negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests into an impasse.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

We are firmly convinced that nuclear weapon tests can and should be prohibited; and all that is needed is good will on both sides. The Soviet Union is ready to sign without any further delay an agreement prohibiting all nuclear weapon tests for all time, with the use of the national means of detecting nuclear explosions which are already at the disposal of States for the purpose of control over compliance with such an agreement. Agreement on this question can easily be reached now, as it could have been earlier, on the realistic and equitable basis which life itself suggests.

Mr. STELLE (United States): The Committee has been presented this morning with two important documents. In the first place, the representatives of Ethiopia, Nigeria and the United Arab Republic have submitted to the Conference the text of the resolution on disarmament (ENDC/93/Rev.1) drawn up by the African Heads of State at their recent conference in Addis Ababa. In line with my Government's stated policy of studying carefully all responsible initiatives on disarmament and nuclear testing, we have been and are considering that important resolution. In the course of preliminary study by my delegation of its text, we have noted that many of the recommendations concern subjects already under consideration in this Conference. For example, there are suggestions related to the banning of nuclear weapon testing, and to the conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. We greet with satisfaction the continuing interest of the African Heads of State in disarmament and related questions, and are gratified to see that that interest is increasing, as exemplified in the resolution which has been presented to our Conference this morning.

Much of what is proposed in the resolution lies within the particular sphere of the relations among the African States themselves, or between some of them and States outside Africa. That circumstance appears to indicate that further actions in this sphere will be required before some of the proposals in the resolution reach a state where their practical implementation can be studied.

Concerning the appeal of the African States to the great Powers to reduce conventional weapons, to put an end to the arms race, and to negotiate an agreement on general and complete disarmament, my delegation can assure the representatives of the African States here that my Government will continue to exert every effort to achieve those ends.

(Mr. Stelle, United States):

The second important document which was presented to our Conference this morning was the memorandum of the delegations of Ethiopia, Nigeria and the United Arab Republic on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests (ENDC/94). It was a matter of regret to my delegation that the response of the Soviet representative to the presentation of that memorandum was a lengthy reiteration of the Soviet position, including, if I may say so, many elements of propaganda. The Soviet representative saw fit to refer to underground nuclear weapon tests conducted by the United States Atomic Energy Commission last week. The Soviet representative knows that to be a continuation of a series of underground nuclear weapon tests conducted by the United States. The Soviet representative knows when and why this series of tests began. It began in the autumn of 1961 after the abrupt resumption of nuclear weapon tests by the Soviet Union at that time. The Soviet representative charged again that the United States test series is being conducted in violation of United Nations resolution 1762A(XVII). However, the Soviet representative has again ignored the repeated efforts of the United States and the United Kingdom and of other States in this Conference to reach an interim agreement under that resolution which would have made possible the cessation of all tests under effective control. The Soviet Union has chosen up to now to ignore the will of the General Assembly, and has failed up to now to negotiate for and accept reasonable measures of effective control to put an end to testing under resolution 1762A(XVII).

It was also a matter of regret to my delegation that, immediately following the presentation of the memorandum of the delegations of Ethiopia, Nigeria, and the United Arab Republic -- in which there is a recognition of the need for on-site inspection and an emphasis on the desirability of negotiating adequate and effective modalities for such inspection -- the Soviet representative again saw fit to repeat the stale and discredited Soviet position, claiming that there is no need for on-site inspection and that the only reason the United States wishes on-site inspection is for espionage purposes.

I have said that the memorandum of the three African delegations is an important document. We see that it has been carefully prepared. My delegation will refer it to my Government, and I know that my Government will give it close study.

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): I think I am right in saying that for various reasons it is now some little time since we have been able to use one of our Monday meetings for considering the question of nuclear tests and the conclusion of a nuclear test ban treaty. I must say that I find it significant and indeed very encouraging that on this, so to say, resumption of our discussions the opportunity should have been taken by our African colleagues at this Conference to present to us the two important documents which they have submitted today: the declaration by the Heads of African States at the Addis Ababa Conference (ENDC/93/Rev.1), and the three-nation memorandum drawn up in fulfilment of that declaration (ENDC/94). We have received those documents with great interest, as our United States colleague has said. The Heads of States declaration is already under close study in London, and that study will be facilitated by the explanatory comments given in the three-nation memorandum.

I have listened also with close attention to the eloquent statements which have been made here this morning on this subject by our colleagues from Nigeria and from the United Arab Republic. Those statements were both eloquent, as I say, and statesmanlike, and we shall study them both here and in London with the care and attention which they undoubtedly deserve.

I wish I could say the same for the remarks to which the Conference has been treated on this occasion by our Soviet colleague, but, to be completely frank, I have never heard in this Conference a more extraordinary procedure than that which he adopted. I am bound to say that if our Soviet colleague had wished to seem to put the statements and the documents submitted by our African colleagues into the shade, to lessen the impact of them on this Conference, and indeed, as our United States colleague has just pointed out, in some respects to try to cut away some of the ground on which they were based, he could hardly have improved upon his performance this morning.

So far as he used any arguments in the course of it which have not already been disposed of before, those arguments will be studied by our delegation and we shall answer them as and when we consider that to be fit. But I do not wish to take up the time of the Conference on that this morning. I judge that it will be completely out of keeping with what our colleagues wish: to welcome the initiatives taken by our African colleagues and to agree to study them with the care and sympathy which they deserve.

Mr. de CASTRO (Brazil) (translation from French): It is with the greatest satisfaction that the delegation of Brazil warmly welcomes the contribution --- in our opinion a most timely and valuable one -- made to our Conference by the representatives of the African countries in our Committee, those of Ethiopia, Nigeria and the United Arab Republic.

Brazil has at all times endeavoured to make its modest contribution to the preservation of peace and the defence of world security by striving both to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons, which we regard as fearsomely aggravating the impending danger of the annihilation of mankind, and in every possible way to discourage the arms race and thus reduce the social tension that merely heightens the danger of war.

Now, the two documents before us this morning -- the resolution signed by the thirty Heads of African States at the summit Conference in Addis Ababa (ENDC/93/Rev.1), and the memorandum (ENDC/94) based on that resolution which comes to us here in the form of an appeal to the Heads of States of the great nuclear Powers to end the arms race and, in particular, to agree on some equitable basis to ban nuclear tests -- suggest ways and means whereby we may break out of the deadlock in which we find ourselves. These two documents --- I stress the point -- cover these different aspects of the problem and are therefore an invaluable contribution to the cause of peace.

Brazil being one of the States that signed the joint declaration of the Latin-American countries designed to make Latin America a denuclearized zone (ENDC/87), we cannot remain silent but must on the contrary express our satisfaction with the similar initiative adopted by the African countries, which in its conciseness, precision and practicality shows their political maturity, their understanding of the international situation and their sense of responsibility towards present-day reality and world politics.

The Brazilian delegation is the more happy to note this act, in that it is in line with my country's foreign policy. As the Deputy Secretary-General of our Foreign Ministry, Ambassador Araujo Castro, clearly stated a few days ago, Brazil is trying to base its foreign policy on a trinomial, which he calls a 3-D trinomial, meaning that Brazil's foreign policy is primarily based on three cardinal points: Disarmament, Development and Decolonization. The Addis Ababa resolution is framed in a general



(Mr. de Castro, Brazil)

context covering these three aspects. The aim has been to deal essentially with the disarmament problem within the framework of decolonization, that is to say, the desire of the African people for self-determination and economic and social emancipation. So into this framework comes the problem of economic development -- that potent idea which is emerging all over the world and which has once again found expression in the collective desire of the representatives of the African nations.

Thus the three problems -- disarmament, development and decolonization -- are, in our opinion, closely linked and the solution of each depends on the overall solution of the other two; for we shall never have peace in our economically unbalanced world, nor shall we ever succeed in balancing and truly decolonizing our world until a different climate prevails -- a peaceful atmosphere, instead of the cold war with the divisions it causes in the world preventing genuine equilibrium and genuine development. Within that context, then, we warmly welcome once again the attitude adopted by the African countries towards the true defence of peace.

I think that the memorandum which has been submitted for the consideration of the countries members of the nuclear club should also have some repercussions; for it expresses the feelings of a large part of the world -- of thirty countries which openly declare their opposition to the arms race, to armaments and, specifically, to nuclear armaments -- and, consequently, their desire to strengthen ways and means of achieving peace.

I believe that a fourth "D", Denuclearization, which has just been proposed for and by the African continent, should be added to the "three D's" -- Development, Decolonization and nuclear Disarmament. I hope that one day, on the "D-day" of peace, we shall have a fifth "D", the "D" for general and complete disarmament. That will be the day for acknowledging -- and I feel sure that the whole world will acknowledge -- proposals like today's by these young nations which, though young, are mature enough to decide their own fate. They know that their fate, like that of all nations in the world, depends on the fate of all mankind, because the security of every country, strong or weak, big or small, nuclearized or not nuclearized, depends essentially on universal security. That is the spirit in which we must all unite and rally in a supreme effort to safeguard the security on which depends the safety of each one of us, of every country, of all peoples and of all citizens of the world.

(Mr. de Castro, Brazil)

Once again, then, we just wish to welcome this initiative and to reiterate our hope that other regions of the world will adopt the same attitude and that all Powers will support this idea, this aspiration, this legitimate and definite desire of mankind to survive and to leave nothing undone to ensure survival, bearing in mind the terrible but very perspicacious, clear and forthright comment of a few days ago by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, that we were on the horns of a dilemma: co-existence or non-existence. I think we would all choose co-existence.

Mr. LALL (India): We should like to join in welcoming the very important initiative taken today by our three African colleagues. We feel sure that both the resolution which they have presented and the memorandum which stands in their names will be studied very carefully by all the nuclear Powers and that it will contribute greatly towards a solution.

We were glad that our colleague from the United Kingdom referred to the initiative as significant and encouraging, and that he told us not only that his delegation welcomed the initiative but also that the memorandum would be studied with care. We believe that our colleague from the United States also said that this initiative would be referred to his Government and that his Government would give it close study. I believe that our Soviet colleague, too, talked in satisfactory terms of the initiative taken in Addis Ababa by the Heads of State; and we feel sure that it will be the intention of his delegation also to study the memorandum carefully as a significant and important contribution to the solution of this grave and pressing problem of the cessation of nuclear tests.

Once again, we welcome the initiative and we hope very much that it may help to solve this problem.

Baron von PLATEN (Sweden): I listened with the greatest interest and concentration to the valuable contribution and constructive thinking which we heard in the statements made by the representatives of the three African States at this Conference. They were, as Mr. Hassan said, independent and indivisible contributions to facilitate a test-ban treaty and also, in the last passage of the statement made by the representative of the United Arab Republic, to facilitate a package deal.

(Baron von Platen, Sweden)

We have now a very rich collection of ideas. In her statement of 22 May, Mrs. Myrdal said:

"... through the statements by the non-aligned nations, a model does lie prepared" -- that is, a model for a test-ban treaty -- "if the great Powers wish to combine the various suggestions made by different non-aligned nations at the Conference. ... If the nuclear Powers were interested in moving forward, in a needy case like this, with the aid of a tertium datur. if they combined the five or more elements which are available in the records of this Conference, they would have a compromise model to discuss. It would, of course, not surpass their ability to improve on this model as they might deem fit." (ENDC/PV.135).

After the highly constructive contributions which were made this morning, I feel that that statement made by Mrs. Myrdal is still more relevant and still more true today. It seems to me that we have reached a stage in the nuclear test ban discussions where a treaty is even more dependent upon faith and will and wisdom -- faith in disarmament, will to reach disarmament, and wisdom in general -- than upon practical ideas. However, the ideas are there.

I would request the Secretariat to collate and summarize all the ideas put forward up to now by the non-aligned delegations during this part of our negotiations -- that is to say, since Christmas. I think it might be useful to have that. I hope it will be useful for the three countries negotiating a nuclear test ban treaty in case they feel they need impulses and ideas from outside their own immediate circle.

I finish on a note of hope, by welcoming this contribution by the African countries and by reiterating our conviction that the three nuclear Powers will show the three elements of which I have spoken: faith, will and wisdom.

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI (Burma): Mr. Chairman, we have heard with great interest the resolution (ENDC/93/Rev.1) of the Heads of independent African States, adopted at the historic meeting of the thirty Heads of African States held recently in Addis Ababa, which you were kind enough to read out. That resolution, inspired by the spirit of independence of the African peoples, reflects the concern that the nations of Africa have for the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament and in particular the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, a problem whose settlement brooks no delay.

(U Maung Maung Gyi, Burma)

The delegation of Burma welcomes the initiative taken by the African Heads of State and believes it will make an important contribution to the course of our work here. In addition the delegation of Burma, in the spirit of the resolution, would like to express the hope that the nuclear Powers will further strengthen their will and determination to find a solution to the test ban problem, on which all the essential ingredients for arriving at an agreement now exist.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I should like to make a brief remark. While the delegations of the Western nuclear Powers have this morning given the assurance that the memorandum of the three African countries will be studied by their governments with the greatest care, I have regretfully to point out that the Soviet delegation has merely left us with the hope that this new and important contribution by the three non-aligned delegations will be considered by its Government and examined on its merits.

In this connexion, I am bound to say that this morning's statement by the Soviet delegation, following the declarations of the three representatives of the African countries, was once more designed to prove that inspections are not at all necessary for detecting and identifying clandestine tests. The fact that the Soviet delegation keeps reiterating that theme after nevertheless agreeing to the principle of compulsory inspection, may -- I think -- arouse serious misgivings on the very acceptance of the principle. But at all events the repetition, on this very day, of the argument that inspections are unnecessary seems to run counter to paragraph 6 of the memorandum submitted by the three African delegations (ENDC/94) and to some extent to belie that paragraph, with its explicit acknowledgement of the need for inspections.

I hope that the Soviet delegation will take the trouble to study the text of the memorandum later and that, after showing its appreciation of the Addis Ababa resolution, it will not care to contradict itself and disregard a memorandum submitted here as a positive follow-up to the resolution by the three delegations of the non-aligned countries of the African continent.

Miss AGUIRRE (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): The Mexican delegation also wishes to associate itself with the favourable reception accorded in this Committee to the proposal tabled by the three African States as a positive contribution to the Committee's negotiations.

(Miss Aguirre, Mexico)

The cessation of nuclear tests, denuclearization, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the cessation of their production and use are the objectives pursued by this Conference and desired by the whole world. The documents submitted this morning once again reveal the yearning of all the peoples of the world for general and complete disarmament and world peace. The African proposal is an appeal to the nuclear Powers to resolve their differences. All the peoples of the world join in that appeal.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and forth-second plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Ato M. Ghebeyehu, representative of Ethiopia.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Ethiopia, Nigeria, the United Arab Republic, Italy, the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, Brazil, India, Sweden, Burma and Mexico.

"The delegations of Ethiopia, Nigeria and the United Arab Republic submitted (1) a resolution passed by the African Summit Conference at Addis Ababa on general and complete disarmament<sup>1/</sup> and (2) a joint memorandum of the delegations of Ethiopia, Nigeria and the United Arab Republic on the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.<sup>2/</sup>

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 12 June 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.

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<sup>1/</sup> circulated as document ENDC/93/Rev.1

<sup>2/</sup> circulated as document ENDC/94

